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Wylie Sp.icer*

Deepwater Horizon: Lessons for the
Offshore

This paper reviews the regulatory framework governing offshore oil and gas
operations on the continental shelf. Offshore exploration comprises both marine
and industrial elements, regulated through a complex web of national (coastal
state) regulation and international conventions, the latter primarily directed
towards the marine aspects of operations. Following the Deepwater Horizon
disaster of 2010, the adequacy of current regulatory approaches came under
increased scrutiny It is argued in this paper that the growing complexity of the
industry, coupled with increasing activity in deepwater and Arctic environments,
requires development of a more robust system of international regulation.

L'article examine le cadre reglementaire qui rdgit les activit6s gazi~res et
pdtrolieres sur le plateau continental. L'exploration extracti~re comporte des
•l6ments marins et des 6lements industriels regis par un ensemble complexe
de r~glements et de conventions nationales (-ats c6tiers), ces dernieres visant
principalement les aspects maritimes de ces activit6s. A la suite de Ia catastrophe
de la plateforme Deepwater Horizon en 2010, le caractere ad6quat des regimes
r6glementaires actuels a fait I'objet d'examens de plus en plus approfondis.
L'auteur allgue que la complexit6 croissante de Iindustrie,jumelde . l'intensitd
de plus en plus grande des travaux en eau profonde et dans l'Arctique, exige
I'Plaborationet la mise en place d'un systeme de r~glements internationaux plus
stricts.
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Introduction
Despite this predominantly industrial focus the activity takes place at
sea. The unique nature of this industrial-marine endeavour, together with
the constant evolution of new technology, has presented a .challenge to
agencies established to set standards and govern the design and activities
of more traditional craft.... Despite the newness and diversity of the
industry, one trend has become clear for both the participants and the
regulators: offshore drilling has emerged as an industrial activity that
takes place in the marine environment rather than as a marine activity
undertaken for industrial purposes.
This quotation from the Report of the Royal Commission on the Ocean
Ranger Marine Disaster of 1982 still rings true today. The dynamic
between the industrial and marine elements of the industry continues to
be influential. In some respects, it is a confusing aspect of the regulation
of this industry.
There are two other influences in the offshore industry, regulation
by the coastal state in which the industry is carrying on business, and an
umbrella of International Conventions which apply to the offshore. The
influence of the coastal state is due to the fact that oil and gas operations
involve a long-term commitment to carrying on business in proximity to
a coastal state. Accordingly, the coastal state takes considerable interest
1. Royal Commission on the Ocean Ranger Marine Disaster: The Loss of the SeinsubmersibleDrill
Rig Ocean Rangerand its Crew, vol 1 (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1984) at viii
[Ocean Ranger].
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in the way in which the activities are carried on, whether in its territorial
waters, 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or beyond in the waters
of an extended continental shelf.2 International conventions apply because
of the maritime connection to the industry.
There are thus four interests at play in the offshore industry. The
marine component is sensitive to the fact that the work takes place for the
most part on ships.' The industrial component is driven by the nature of
the work, drilling a hole in the ground with a view to creating a production
facility. The coastal state interest is in ensuring that the work is carried
out safely with appropriate regard to benefits accruing to the coastal state.
International conventions share subject matter relevancy to the activities
.of the offshore industry.
This paper examines the complexity of the regulatory regime
governing the operation of offshore oil and gas drilling and production,
using the Reports from the Deepwater Horizon4 as a starting point for
the discussion. The paper criticizes the patchwork quilt of regulation
and argues that as the industry becomes increasingly complex, better
international regulation is required. The Arctic is also discussed in light of
the DeepwaterHorizon Reports.'
I. The role of conventions
Compared to the offshore industry, regulation of the marine industry has
been straightforward and, in many cases, international reaction to disasters
at sea has been swift. The Titanic sank in 1912 and by 1914 the first steps
2.
Article 82 of the UN Convention on the Law oftheSea 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397,21
ILM 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) provides that the coastal statepay a royalty to the
international seabed authority for production taking place on the extended continental shelf. Canada
has exploration licenses on its extended continental shelf. Russia, the United States and Canada are
currently mapping the seabed of the Arctic Ocean in order to make extended continental shelf claims.
See Wylie Spicer QC & Tanya Bath, "The Canadian Arctic: The Changing Seascape of Offshore Oil
and Gas Exploration Issues" (2010) 48 Alta L Rev 255.
3.
Wylie Spicer, "Some Admiralty Issues in Offshore Oil and Gas Development" (1982) 20 Alta L
Rev 153 [Spicer, "Admiralty Issues"].
4.
The reports are: National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore
Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling, Report to the
Presidont (January 2011), online: National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling <http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER_
ReporttothePresidentF1NAL.pdf> [President's Report]; National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Macondo, The Gulf Oil Disaster,Chief Counsel's Report
2011, online: National Commission on the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling <http://
www.oilspillcommission.gov/chief-counsels-report> [Chief Counsel's Report]; United States Coast
Guard, Report of Investigation into the circumstances surrounding the explosion, fire, sinking and
loss of eleven crew members aboard the mobile offshore drilling unit, Deepwater Horizon, in the
Gulf of Mexico April 20-22, 2010, vol 1, online: Bryant's Maritime Consulting <http://www.brymarconsulting.com/wp-content/uploads/Misc/JITReportVol l.pdf> [Coast Guard Report].
5.
Spicer, "Admiralty Issues," supra note 3.
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had been taken to put in place an international convention focussing on
safety of life at sea.6 The 1978 sinking of the Amoco Cadiz resulted in the
1982 ParisMemorandum of Understandingon Port State Control,7 which
is seen as one international attempt to better regulate flags of convenience
due to the ability of a port to detain a vessel that it finds is not complying
with international safety standards. The Paris MOU, SOLAS and other
international conventions cast a very wide net over the worldwide marine
industry. Its regulation is not focussed on a relationship with a coastal
state.
The responses of the offshore industry to disasters have rarely taken
place at the international level. There has been an absence of an enforceable
international regime in the offshore industry. There is extensive regulation,
but it is in large part driven either by business or by the coastal state
rather than by an agreement among countries involved concerning the
appropriate international standards to be enforced. The usual players in
advancing international maritime issues have played a relatively small
part in the offshore. Many of the international conventions dealing with
maritime matters are, however, applied in the offshore, such as SOLAS
and the InternationalConvention on Standards of Training, Certification
and Watchkeepingfor Seafarers.' The International Maritime Organization
(IMO) and similarly, the National Maritime Law Associations and the

6.
InternationalConvention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1 November 1974, 1184 UNTS 2, Can
TS 1980 No 45 (entered into force 25 May 1980) [SOLAS Convention]. SOLAS has become an
integral part of the safety regime for shipping throughout the world. In Canada, its many aspects are,
recognized in regulations made pursuant to the CanadaShippingAct, 2001, SC 2001, c 26.
7. The Paris MOU was agreed to in 1982 to coordinate port inspections. Canada is one of the
twenty-seven countries that inspect vessels in accordance with the Paris MOU. There are also other
port state control systems that regulate other ports in the world, including the Tokyo MOU, the
Caribbean MOU and US Coast Guard port state control. The purpose of these MOUs is to better
regulate safety of vessels.
8. International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for.
Seafarers, 7 July 1978, 1361 UNTS 2, Can TS 1988 No 36 (entered into force 28 April 1984) [STCw].
This convention is the first to establish basic requirements on training certification and watch keeping
for seafarers at an international level. As noted on the IMO website, the previous standards for such
activities were established by individual governments without reference to practices in other countries
and "as a result standards and procedures varied widely, even though shipping is the most international
of all industries": <http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/InternationalConvention-on-Standards-of-Training,-Certification-and-Watchkeeping- for-Seafarers-(STCW).
aspx>. In the context of the development of international regulation of the offshore industry, this
comment by the IMO concerning seafarers is noteworthy.
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Comit6 Maritime Internationale (CMI)9 have not been very successful in
advancing the Convention agenda, although efforts have been made.
The Deepwater Horizon highlighted the difficulties inherent in
regulating the offshore industry, and should stand as a signpost for better
international regulation. The reports that emanated from the Deepwater
Horizon stimulate discussion in a number of areas and demonstrate
the complexity of the regulatory framework. The reports explain the
obligations of the Deepwater Horizon flag state and its consequent
responsibilities with respect to its management, including the rules and
obligations of the vessel classification societies. The reports criticize
the owners of the Deepwater Horizon, the oil company operator and
contractors working onboard. Ambiguities in the command structure
onboard the vessel are discussed, as are the applicability of various of the
international conventions including the InternationalSafety Management
Code (ISM Code),'0 the STCW Convention, the Mobile Offshore Drilling
Unit Code" and others.
It is striking in reviewing the President's Report in DeepwaterHorizon
that there is virtually no reference to the maritime aspects of the situation
and no commentary, positive or negative, as to whether better international
regulation is called for. The same comments can be made of the Chief
Counsel's Report. The absence of consideration of the marine issues in
these reports lead to the conclusion that the industry still considers itself
as industrial but taking place in a marine environment. I believe this
assessment is incorrect. A preferred characterization would be that it is
9.
The CMI is the oldest world organization exclusively concerned with the uniformity of maritime
law. Its members are the national maritime law associations of many countries. The CMI has
cooperated with IMO since the stranding of the Torrey Canyon in 1967. The CMI worked with IMO
in generating the international convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage, a consequence of
the Torrey Canyon stranding. The CMI continues to draft conventions for consideration by IMO.The
CMI has been involved in the drafting of conventions for structures operating in the offshore.
10. The purpose of the ISM Code is to provide international standards for the safe management
and operation of ships and for pollution prevention. SOLAS adopted the ISM Code in 1994. As of 1
July 2002, it became mandatory for self-propelled mobile offshore drilling units (MODU): SOLAS
Convention, supra note 6 at chapter IX (amended 2000). One of the requirements of the ISM Code
is that each ship/MODU must have a Safety Management System (SMS). This is among the systems
that are reviewed and audited to ensure compliance with the ISM Code. Responsibility for this in the
case of the Deep Water Horizon was delegated by the flag state to Det Norske Veritas (DNV), a vessel
classification society.
11. Code for the Construction and Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 1989, adopted
by Resolution A.649(16) on 19 October 1989 [MODU Code 1989]; Code for the Construction and
Equipment of Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 2009, adopted by Resolution A 1023(26) on 2 December
2009. [MODU Code 2009].These are the two relevant MODU Codes. The 1989 version was adopted
by IMO by Assembly Resolution A.649(16) for MODUs constructed after I May 1991. The 2009
MODU Code was adopted by Resolution A. 1023(26) for MODUs constructed after 1 January 2012.
The 1989 Code applied to the Deeptvater Horizon.
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a marine and industrial industry (marindustrial perhaps) taking place in a
marine environment.
II. The Deepwater Horizonfacts
In order to help situate this paper, it is worth recounting some of the facts
concerning the DeepwaterHorizon. She flew the flag of the Republic of
the Marshall Islands (which became a signatory to the United Nations
Convention on the Law ofthe Sea 12 in 1991). It was a foreign-flagged mobile
offshore drilling unit (MODU). The regulatory regime in the United States
requires only limited oversight of foreign flag vessels engaged in Offshore
Continental Shelf (OCS) activities.13 The flag state had delegated all of its
inspection and investigative responsibilities to the American Bureau of
Shipping (ABS) and Det Norske Veritas (DNV), the vessel classification
societies. 4 The Minimum Safe Manning Certificate (MSMC) issued by
the flag state listed the Deepwater Horizon as a self-propelled MODU
rather than as a dynamic positioned vessel [DP]. Thiswas a mistake on the
part of the flag state,'5 and as a result the STCW Convention did not apply
to the DeepwaterHorizon when it was on station. The DeepwaterHorizon
was built according to the provisions of the MODU Code 1989.16
The worldwide deep water rig fleet has grown significantly in recent
years. In 2008 there were 103 deep water rigs, being forty-six moored semisubmersibles and drill ships and fifty-seven DP vessels. By 2010 the fleet
had grown by twenty-five per cent and due to the attraction of ever deeper
waters, the number of DP vessels rose to eighty-one, whereas moored rigs
grew only two per cent to 48. 1 DP vessels are also in high demand in harsh
environments. Deep water and harsh environment opportunities exist in
many locations including the Gulf of Mexico, Brazil, West Africa, the
Arctic Ocean and offshore eastern Canada. Drilling in these environments
is more complex and carries greater risk. Drilling and producing safely in
these waters adds to the urgency of appropriate regulation. The deep water

12. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397, 21
ILM 1261 (entered into force 16 November 1994) [UNCLOS]. For an interesting discussion of
the relationship between UNCLOS and the IMO conventions see Anna Mihneva-Mitova, "The
Relationship Between United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the IMO Conventions"
(2005), online: United Nations <https://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff programmehome/
fellowspages/fellows papers/natova_0506_bulgaria.pdf'.
13. Coast Guard Report, supra note 4 at iv.
14.

Ibid at iv, ix, xviii.

15. Ibidat27, 114.
16. Ibidat 121.
17. See online: <www.pennenergy.com>. Rowan Companies Inc, a long-time presence in the jackup drilling rig market, announced on 1 June 2011, that they entered into a contract with Hyundai for
the construction of two ultra-deep water drill ships.
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fields of Africa and Latin America are forty-eight per cent of worldwide
deep water fields. It is predicted that the deep water capital expenditures in
Africa will overtake those of Latin America by 2015.18
The Chief Counsel's Report identifies the following issues directly
connected to deep water operations:
Because of the complexities of deepwater operations, developing a major
deepwater oil field can cost enormous sums of money-far more than
shallow water development. To make such developments economically
viable, oil companies must identify highly productive reservoirs and
then install high-productivity wells and production systems. ...Good
shallow water wells produce at rates of a few thousand barrels of oil a
day. By contrast deepwater wells commonly produce more than 10,000
barrels per day. 9
The DeepwaterHorizon was insured for USD $560 Million, the lease rate
was $533,000 per day "[making it] the single greatest expense of drilling
the well."2 The Deepwater Horizon herself was a DP vessel drilling in
deep water. A DP vessel has many advantages, not the least of which is
being fully self-propelled. Some of the disadvantages are that it can fail
to keep position in extreme weather, its position control requires a human
operator, and it requires more personnel to operate.2 These characteristics
have an impact on manning issues.
III. The role of theflag state
The nationality of a vessel is defined by the flag that it flies. A vessel
is subject to the laws of its flag state. Most MODUs qualify as vessels
for the purpose of ship registration. In the early days of the offshore
industry, there was some debate about this point.22 This debate has not
only disappeared but the ship registries of many countries now include
18. Infield, the Energy Analysts, Deepwater & Ultra Deepwater Market Report To 2015, online:
<www.infield.com/news/deepwater-market-report_2015/32> [Deepwater Market Report].
19. Chief Counsel's Report, supra note 4 at 7.
20. Ibid at 245.
21. International Marine Contractors Association, online: IMCA <http://www.imca-int.com>.
"Introduction to Dynamic Positioning," online: <http://www.imca-int.com/media/73055/imcam 103.
pdf> at 1.1; Lambros Klaoudatos, "Station Keeping for Deep Water Mobile Offshore Drilling Units;
an Economic and Operational Perspective" (2005), online: Center for Maritime Economics and
Logistics <http://maritimeeconomics.com/sites/maritimeeconomics.com/files/downloads/LambrosKLAOUDATOS.pdf> at 61. See also Det Norske Veritas, "DNV Rules for Classification, Dynamic
Positioning Systems" (January 2011), online: DNV Managing Risk <http://exchange.dnv.com/
publishing/rulesship/2011-01/>.
22. Michael Summerskill, Oil Rigs: Lav and Insurance (London: Stevens & Son, 1979) at 1-9;
Spicer, "Admiralty Issues," supra note 3 at 153-161; Stevart v Dutra Const Co, 543 US 481, 125 S
Ct 118 (2005).
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MODUs as a category of vessel eligible for registration. The registries
specifically outline the manning requirements for these vessels in their
23
bulletins concerning safe manning.
The manning requirements specified in the vessel registries as they
relate to MODUs are not identical (some are more specific than others).
The DeepwaterHorizon flew the flag of the Marshall Islands, which has a
specific recitation of manning requirements for MODUs. The classification
of the Deepwater Horizon as a "self propelled mobile offshore drilling
unit" meant that insofar as the flag state was concerned, a master was
not required when the unit was on location and only the offshore
installation manager was required. If it had been properly characterized
as a "dynamically positioned unit and drilling ship," a master would
have been required notwithstanding that the Deepwater Horizon was on
location.24 One might ask whether such an obvious mistake should have
been identified by the vessel owner and the crewing requirements treated
as for the same as for a DP vessel.
The Coast Guard Report criticizes the flag state for failing to ensure
that the responsibilities of the classification societies had been adequately
carried out. This criticism, while new to the offshore oil and gas industry,
is not new at all to the marine industry:
Several of the conclusions arising from Deepwater Horizon casualty can
be linked directly to RMI's [the flag state] failure to ensure that Deepwater
Horizon was in compliance with all applicable requirements.... Having
never inspected the vessel except through Recognized Organizations,
RMI entrusted all flag state inspection duties to Recognized Organizations
and did not conduct sufficient oversight of those classification societies
to detect mistakes and accurately determine the condition of its vessel
prior to the casualty. Such oversight is crucial because there is always
a potential conflict of interest in the work of Classification Societies,
as they are paid by the vessel owner and only perform the work the
owner requests. This casualty raises serious questions about the model
under which a flag of open registry may rely-entirely on Classification
Societies to do its inspection and investigative work.25

23. Bahamas Information Bulletin 115, paragraph 1.2 and 7.4 Maritime Authority, online: <http://
www.bahamasmaritime.com/includes/tng/pu5b/tNG download4.php?page=38&KT-downloadl=0a
40143f59d215f8d02f3bbb0f79fcff> [Bahamas Bulletin]. Liberia Marine Notices MAN 001 at 4.5 and
MAN 004, online: <http://www.liscr.com/liscr/Maritime/Documents/tabid/87/Default.aspx#notices>,
and Republic of the Marshall Islands Marine Notice 7-038-2 at 2.2.5, online: <http://www.register-iri.
com/forms/upload/MN-7-038-2.pdf>.
24. Ibid at 2.2.5.
25. Coast Guard Report, supranote 4 at 106-107.
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The above criticism speaks to the inter-relationship between the
classification society and the relevant ship registry, in particular, the
responsibilities of open registries. This criticism also starkly raises duties
that should be assumed by open registries.
UNCLOS deals with the nationality and registration of ships. The
word "ship" is not defined in UNCLOS but includes MODUs.2 6 Article 91
sets out the conditions for a state to grant the right to fly its flag:
Every State shall fix.the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships,
for the registration of ships in its territory, and for-the right to fly its flag.
Ships shall have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled
to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship.
Article 94, "Duties of the Flag State," provides in part that:
Every state shall effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in
administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag.
The Article goes on to specify these obligations including those necessary
to ensure safety at sea, the seaworthiness of the ship and the training and
competence of the master, officers, and crew.
The relationship between Articles 91 and 94 has been the subject of
considerable comment and some litigation. The genuine link requirement
is contained in Article 91 and not 94, which deals with the effective
exercise of flag state jurisdiction. One writer has suggested that:
[T]he criterion of the effective exercise ofjurisdiction and control means
that a flag State must be in a position to exercise effective jurisdiction
and control over a ship at the time that it grants its nationality to that ship.
To demonstrate this, a flag State must be able to show that the necessary
mechanisms for effective exercise ofjurisdiction and control are in place
at the time when the ship is granted its nationality.27
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea commented on the
genuine link question in the MVSaiga No. 2:

26. UNCLOS, supranote 12. See also, Myron N Nordquist, ed, UnitedNations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 1982, A Commentary (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995) at 101 referring to the work
of the UNCLOS Drafting Committee and discussions of the meaning of ship/vessel.
27. Robin R Churchill, "The Meaning of the 'Genuine Link' Requirement in Relation to the
Nationality of Ships" (2000), online: International Transport Workers' Federation <http://www.
itfglobal.org/seafarers/icons-site/images/ITF-Oct200O.pdf> at 71.
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[T]he purpose of the provisions of the Convention on the need for a
genuine link between a ship and its flag state is to secure more effective
implementation of the duties of the flag state, and not to establish criteria
by reference to which the validity of the registration of ships in a flag
state may be challenged by other States.28
The importance of the "genuine link" issue in the context of the Deepwater
Horizon is the potential to insist on a flag state taking greater responsibility
for the ships that fly its flag. 29 Two-thirds of the world's gross tonnage,
652 m gt, is registered in countries with open registries, these being
registries that will register ships owned by foreign entities. Although there
is certainly a commercial interest for countries providing open registries,
there is no relationship of national interest in the ships flying these flags.
The Marshall Islands is one such registry.
IV. The role of the classificationsociety
The Coast Guard Report took issue with the relationship between the
flag state and the classification society, criticizing the flag state for never
having inspected the vessel except through the medium of the classification
societies (referred to as "Recognized Organizations"):
As the coastal state, the United States only intervenes by detaining
or restricting operations on those foreign-flagged vessels that have
blatant deficiencies under International Conventions or applicable
U.S. regulation. The Coast Guard relies heavily on the flag state, such
as the RMI [Marshall Islands] to ensure that foreign-flagged MODUs
operating on the U.S. Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) are actually in
compliance with all applicable international laws and regulations. The
inadequate oversight over DEEPWATER HORIZON by the RMI and
its recognized organizations, along with the failure of Transocean's
SMS [safety management system], created an unsafe environment
that allowed the DEEPWATER HORIZON catastrophe to occur. These
failings also raise questions with regard to the level of safety provided
by "open registries."30
The Deepwater Horizon reports stopped short of criticizing the
classification societies directly. Their role was, however, noted for the

28. M/V "Saiga" (No 2) Case (Saint incent and the Grenadines v Guinea), International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea, 1 July 1999, online: World Courts <http://www.worldcourts.com/itlos/eng/
decisions/1999.07.01 SaintVincent_v_Guinea.pdf> at para 83.
29. Nivedita M Hosanee, "A Critical Analysis of Flag State Duties as laid down under Article 94
of the 1983 United States Convention on the Law of the Sea" (New York: United Nations Division
for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 2009), online: United Nations <http://www.un.org/depts/
los/nippon/unnff programme home/fellows_pages/fellows_papers/hosanee_0910_mauritious.pdf>
at 19, 22.
30. Coast Guard Report, supranote 4 at 89-90 [footnote omitted].
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attention of Congress, in the Deepwater Horizon Congressional Research
Service Issues for Congress:
Some have questioned the credibility of classification societies, because
the societies are paid by vessel owners. Classification Societies typically
have a for-profit side of their business, selling technical expertise to
vessel owners, and they compete with each other.
In order to properly understand the issues around Classification Societies,
it is necessary to briefly review the history. Initially it was the insurers of
vessels that utilized Classification Societies in order to ensure themselves
of the characteristics of the vessel they were to insure. Over the centuries
this role has changed substantially so that at the present a Classification
Society is hired by a ship owner to render opinions concerning the ship's
compliance with the rules of the Classification Society and secondly,
the Classification Societies are utilized by flag states to ensure the
compliance of vessels flying their flags with regulations concerning inter
alia the safety of ships."
Classification societies began by performing the private functions
contracted to them by insurers and, latterly, ship owners, the role they have
now taken on as the de facto representative of a flag state is very niuch
a public role.3 2 It is this public function that connects the classification
societies to Article 94 of UNCLOS.
In 1968 a number of the classification societies formed the International
Association of Classification Societies (IACS), 3 of .which there are
currently thirteen member societies. The formation of IACS was partly
responsive to the proliferation of classification societies and a concern
expressed by the members of IACS that certain classification societies
were.not upholding the expected standards of classification societies.
As already noted, the Marshall Islands delegated many of their
responsibilities to the relevant classification societies. In 1986, the United
Nations adopted The United Nations Convention on Conditions for
Registrationof Ships.3 This convention was an attempt by the international
community to regulate the activities of the ship registries, The Convention

31. Curry L Hagerty & Jonathan L Ramseur, "Deep Water Horizon Oil Spill: Selected Issues for
Congress" (Congressional Research Service, 30 July 2010), online: Federation of American Scientists
<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41262.pdf> at 17 [Hagerty & Ramseur].
32. An excellent analysis of the public/private role of the classification society is contained in
Anthony M Antapassis, "Liability of Classification Societies," online: (2007) 11:3 Electronic Journal
of Comparative Law <http://www.ejcl.org/l13/articlel 13-22.pdf>.
33. The role of which is described at International Association of Classification Societies Ltd,
online: IACS <http://www.iacs.org.uk> [IACS].
34. United Nations Convention on Conditionsfor Registration ofShips, 7 February 1986, 26 ILM
1229.
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includes requirements on a flag state respecting manning that are very
similar to Articles 91 and 94 of UNCLOS. This convention is not yet in
force. Unlike UNCLOS, it does contain a definition of "ship" which seems
quite restrictive and may well not include MODUs:
Ship means any self-propelled sea-going vessel used in international
seabome trade for the transport of goods, passengers, or both with the
exception of vessels of less than 500 gross registered tons.35
Due to the proliferation of open registries, IMO expressed its concern about
the delegation offlag state duties to classification societies. IMO Resolution
A.739 (18) addresses "Guidelines for the Authorization of Organizations
Acting on Behalf of the Administration. '36 This was an attempt by IMO
to better regulate the delegation by a flag state to a classification society
in connection with the monitoring of certain important conventions. 37 This
resolution, in Appendix 1, specifies "[m]inimum standards for recognized
organizations acting on behalf of the Administration." These standards
were an attempt by IMO to better regulate the relationships between flag
states and classification societies.
Classification societies are used in many different countries, upon many
different grounds, and according to many different legal systems. 38 Their
success in defending themselves has not been uniform. These suits for the
most part have alleged breach of the obligations arising out of the private
function of a classification society in issuing certificates. The purpose of
discussing classification societies in this paper is to point out their role
in the complex regulatory framework governing the offshore. The flag
state/classification societies relationship is historically an important link
in international efforts to secure safety in the shipping world. By virtue of
the designation of MODUs as vessels capable of registration, this marine
regulatory system plays an important part in the offshore.

35. Ibid, Article 2.
36. International Maritime Organization, Assembly 18th session, Resolution A 739(18) adopted
on 4 November 1993, "Guidelines for the Authorization of Organizations Acting on Behalf of the
Administration" Res A.739(18) (1993).
37. Including those related to SOLAS. Similar concerns gave rise to the ParisMOU, supra note 7.
38. Barbara Vaughan, "The Liability of Classification Societies," online: University of Cape Town
<http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/assign2006/vaughan>; Sean Diederich Durr, "An Analysis ofthe
Potential Liability of Classification Societies: Developing Role, Current Disorder & Future Prospects,"
online: University of Cape Town <http://web.uct.ac.za/depts/shiplaw/theses/durr.htm>; Machale A
Miller, "Liability of Classification Societies from the Perspective of United States Law" (1997) 22
Tul Mar LJ 75; BD Daniel, "Potential Liability of Marine Classification Societies to Non-Contracting
Parties" (2006) 19 USF Mar LJ 183.
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V. Who is in charge of the mobile offshore drilling unit
Concern about who is in charge has been part of the offshore industry for
a very long time. The issue was discussed in the Inquiry Report into the
1965 Sea Gem disaster.39 This was one of the first rigs to work offshore in
the North Sea. The Sea Gem was a converted barge with ten support legs.
During preparation to move the rig to a new location, the legs collapsed
and thirteen crew members died. Amongst other recommendations, the
report identified the necessity for a master or person of unquestioned
authority offshore.
As a consequence of this report, the requirement for an offshore
installation manager (OIM) was created in the UK through the Mineral
Workings (Offshore InstallationsAct), 197140 section 4 of which contains
extensive requirements related to the OIM.
The Ocean Ranger Report of 1984 attracted attention to the command
structure onboard the rig:
For a time the question was simply 'who should be in charge, the master
or the tool pusher?' To residents of the Atlantic Provinces with their long
seafaring history and traditions there is only one answer to that question.
Rigs like the Ocean Ranger are self-propelled, have a crew and go on
long ocean voyages. The mere thought of replacing the traditional marine
crew with industrial
personnel is foreign to the mind of a seafaring
41
community.
And from the same report:
The role and responsibility of the master became evident from the
testimony of the five former masters of the Ocean Ranger who appeared
before the Royal Commission. The master was placed in the difficult
position of having responsibility for marine matters without the42authority
to ensure that these responsibilities were properly discharged.
The US Coast Guard Report on the Ocean Ranger also identified this issue
and made a number of recommendations to ensure that the person in charge

39. JR Adams, Inquiry into the causes of the accidentto the drillingrig, Sea Gem (London: Ministry
of Power, 1967) [Sea Gem Inquiry].
40. Mineral Workings (Offshore Installations)Act 1971, 1971 (UK), c 61,s4 (repealed SI 1995/738,
reg 22, Sch I Pt 1).
41. Ocean Ranger, supranote I at 150.
42. Ibid at 37.
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be properly identified and familiar with and trained in the appropriate
marine regulations.4 3
Since the Ocean Ranger Report, a great deal has changed in the
regulation of manning and training of persons working on MODUs.
In 1999 IMO passed "Recommendations on Training of Personnel on
Mobile Offshore Units,"' which applies to vessels "which can be readily
relocated and which can perform an industrial function involving offshore
operations."" The OIM is defined as "a competent person appointed
in writing by the owner as the person in charge, who has complete and
ultimate command of the unit and to whom all personnel on board are
responsible."" The specialized requirements for OIM include knowledge,
experience and competence in areas that relate both to the maritime and
industrial aspects of the operation of a MODU.47
Canada requires that a person seeking to become an OIM shall have
extensive experience in all aspects of MODU operation." The Offshore
Petroleum Boards on the Canadian east coast require an operator to
meet the standards of training and qualifications set out in the Canadian
Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) Manual, which requires that
the OIM:
[I]s the person in charge of the installation at all times. [He/she]
is responsible for the safety of onboard personnel, the integrity of
the installation and the conduct of the operation in accordance with
applicable regulations and policies.

43. United States Coast Guard, Marine Casualty Report: Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit (MODU)
Ocean Ranger ON 615641, Capsizing and Sinking inthe Atlantic Ocean on 15 February 1982 with
multiple loss of life
(20 May 1983), online: United States Coast Guard <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/
cg545/docs/boards/oceanranger.pdf5 > at 139 found that: "Tool pushers were well-trained in the drilling
operations aspects of a MODU. There was no indication that they were familiar with or trained in the
Coast Guard Regulations or the marine aspects of the rig in order to properly discharge their duties as
a 'Person in Charge."'
44. International Maritime Organization, Assembly 21st session, Resolution A 891(21) adopted on
25 November 1999, "Recommendations on Training of Personnel on Mobile Offshore Units (MOUs)."
45. lbidat2.1.
46. Ibidat2.1.8.
47. Ibid at 6.2.
48. Transport Canada, "The Examination and Certification of Seafarers-Revision 4-TP, 2293
E (2004), Transport Publication TP 2293 E c 54-Offshore Installation Manager (O1M), MODU/
self-elevating," online: Transport Canada <http://www.tc.gc.ca/eng/marinesafety/tp-archive-tp2293menu-3161 .htm>.
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The OIM is designated by agreement between the operator and the
owner of the installation. The person so designated must fulfill all the
and have a letter
qualification and training requirements for the position,
49
of appointment issued by the operating company.

The offshore industry is replete with training courses for OIMs. The
International Marine Contractors Association (IMCA), in its guidelines
for the operation of DP vessels, describes the responsibility of the master/
OIM:
The master/OIM is finally responsible for the safety of his vessel/platform
and all personnel onboard or working from her. The master/OIM has
ultimate authority in extreme circumstances, and after due consideration
with a drilling supervisor, to forbid the start or order the termination of
drilling operations on grounds of safety to personnel or the installation."
The Coast Guard Report" criticized what it saw as a dual command
organizational structure (created by the mistake in flagging), which had
the potential to create a situation "where it was unclear who was in charge"
on the vessel. 52 The Report goes on to conclude that:
The master apparently did not know that he had the authority to activate
the Emergency Disconnect System, a critical step that could have cut off
the flow of flammable gasses to the MODU.53

Deepwater Horizon was built according to 1989 MODU Code,54 which
requires operating manuals to be onboard that contain the necessary
information to safely operate the MODU.5 5 For emergency operations,
information must be in a manual that will provide "guidance for the
person in charge in determining cause(s)."56 The Code is also quite specific
concerning the responsibilities of the person in charge in the case of an
emergency:

49. Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, Atlantic Canada Offshore Petroleum Industry,
StandardPracticefor the Trainingand Qualificationsof Personnel(Calgary: Canadian Association
of Petroleum Producers, 2008), online: Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Petroleum Board <http://www.
cnsopb.ns.ca/pdfs/raw.pdf> at 108.
50. International Marine Contractors Association, Guidelines for the Design and Operation of
Dynamically Positioned Vessels, (London: International Marine Contractors Association, 2007),
online: International Marine Contractors Association <http://www.imca-int.com/media/73055/
imcaml03.pdf> at 3.6.1.
51. Coast Guard Report, supranote 4.
52. Ibid at 28.
53. Ibid at 101.
54. MODU Code 1989, supra note 11.
55. Ibidat 14.1.1.
56. Ibid at14.1.4.6.

220

The Dalhousie Law Journal

The person on each unit to whom all personnel on board are responsible
in an emergency should be clearly defined. This person should be
designated by title by the owner or operator of the unit or the agent of
either of them. 7
Similar requirements are contained in the 2009 MODU Code.58
Continuing issues involving command responsibilities and flag state
requirements demonstrate a lack of international consensus.
VI. Differing methods of regulation
Regulation proceeds in many ways:
* Industry associations band together to create codes of conduct by
which they govern themselves and/or the standards/products of
the association.
0 Coastal states issue regulations to govern offshore activities. They
may also issue "guidelines" to assist in the interpretation of their
regulations. All of this is pursuant to statutory authority.
0 International organizations produce guidelines to assist in the
governance of the trade in question.
0 The United Nations adopts Conventions to regulate activities
worldwide.
The offshore industry is subject to all of the above methods. There is little
consistency on what goals are to be accomplished by all this regulation.
Deepwater Horizon illustrates the lack of an international consensus. A
few examples:
1. The classification societies have assumed inspection responsibilities
for a number of flag states. Many of these flag states are parties to
UNCLOS and are governed by Article 94. As noted earlier, this Article
requires the flag state to take measures to ensure, amongst other things,
the "seaworthiness of ships." This responsibility is delegated by the
flag state to a classification society. The IACS recognizes this role and
refers to Article 94.59 In another part of the IACS website, dealing with
the private role of the society to issue certificates of class, it states that
the certificates "should not be construed as a warranty of safety, fitness
for purpose or seaworthiness of the ship." It is well understood that the
obligation to render a ship seaworthy is not one that can be delegated by

57.
58.
59.

Ibid at 14.8.1.
MODUCode2OO9,supra note 11 at 14.9.
IACS, supranote 33.
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the owner.60 Thus, a certification from a classification society does not in
and of itself establish seaworthiness. This law developed in the context
of common-law contractual obligations arising from the private role of
a classification society in its relationship with a vessel owner. The public
role of the classification society, however, comes from Article 94 which
establishes a legal obligation on the part of the flag state. It is interesting
that the potential conflict of interest for a classification society fulfilling
both a private and public role is recognized by the Newfoundland Offshore
Certificate of Fitness Regulations which prohibit a certifying authority
(classification society) from issuing a certificate of fitness "if [they] ha[ve]
been involved, otherwise than as a certifying authority or a classification
body, in the design, construction or installation of the installation."'" The
legal obligations consequent on the private/public role of the classification
societies needs, in some fashion, to be clarified.
2.
The proliferation ofDP vessels has engendered extensive commentary.
As noted in the Coast Guard Report, the manning of an American flag
MODU would require the presence of a Master/OIM at all times whereas a
foreign flag MODU is not subject to the same requirement.6 2 In November
of 2009, the US Coast Guard issued a notice of proposed rule making with
respect to 46 CFR in order to implement certain amendments to the STCW
Convention and Code.63 Although the definitions of "on location" and
"underway" were not part of the proposed amendments, the IADC sought
to amend these definitions in order to render a DP vessel "on location"
with the consequent manning obligations. The change to the definition of
"on location" proposed was:
On location means an immobile offshore drilling unit is bottom bearing
or moored with anchors placed in the drilling configuration.
to

On location means an immobile offshore drilling unit is bottom bearing,
moored with anchors placed in the drilling configuration, or, when
utilizing dynamic positioning, it is maintaining station at the drilling
location.' 4
60. Charles Goodfellow Lumber Sales Ltd v Verreault, [1971] SCR 522; Scottish Metropolitan
Assurance Co v Canada Steamship Lines Ltd, [1930] SCR 262; E&S Barbour Ltd v Canadian
National Railway Co (1961) 46 MPR 331 (NL Sup Ct), afl'd [1963] SCR 323.
61. Newfoundland Offshore Certificate ofFitness Regulations, SOR/95-100, s 5.
62. Coast Guard Report, supra note 4 at 27.
63. Implementation of the 1995 amendments to the international convention on standards of
training, certification and watchkeepingfor seafarers, 46 Fed Reg Parts 10, 11, 12, 15 (1978) (to be
codified at 46 CFR).
64. IADC correspondence to US Department of Transportation (16 February 2010), online: <http://
www.iadc.org/committees/offshore>.
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These changes would affect US flag DP vessels. They were not adopted.
In an Appendix to the Coast Guard Report, the US Coast Guard
identified a number of "potential legal issues associated with vessels
employing dynamic positioning systems."65 Their conclusion as to the
current state of U.S. law was that a DP vessel:
[I]s an underway, self-propelled vessel, and subject to all the regulatory
requirements of 'traditional' vessels. While operating in DP mode, a
vessel cannot be considered 'on location.'6
One can inquire whether it is sensible international regulation for different
flag states to treat the status of DP vessels in different ways. As noted in
the Coast Guard Appendix:
Vessels flagged by countries that are parties to international safety
conventions to which the U.S. is also a party and offering the same
privileges to U.S. flagged vessels are generally granted reciprocity. As
such, while a U.S. registered MODU equipped with a DP system must be
under the command of a Master (who also holds an Offshore Installation
Manager endorsement), the manning requirements of a foreign registered
MODU are not subject to the same requirement.67
The MODU does the same work wherever it is located.
3.
IMO is responsible to ensure "safe, secure and efficient shipping on
clean oceans."68 IMO is responsible for developing drafts of international
conventions having to do with the maritime industry. Conventions become
enforceable upon being agreed to by a requisite number of countries.
IMO is the most knowledgeable maritime organization worldwide but
unfortunately has no enforcement arm of its own. This has led to it being
described as:
[A] typically idealistic construct for bringing order to the world-a
democratic assembly of 162 member nations, all of them determinedly
equal, who work with the assistance of a technical staff in the consultations
of accredited non-governmental groups to establish regulatory packages
known as conventions, which the individual member states are then free
to adopt (or not) in their sovereign maritime laws. The enforcement of
those laws is a separate question, and it is spotty, because
the arrangement
69
allows the IMO no enforcement powers of its own.
65. Coast Guard Report, supra note 4 at Appendix I.
66. IbidatI-1O.
67. Ibid at 1-7 [footnotes omitted].
68. International Maritime Organization, "Frequently Asked Questions," online: IMO <http://www.
imo.org/About/Pages/FAQs.aspx>.
69. William Langewiesche, "Anarchy At Sea," Atlantic Monthly, (September 2003), online: Atlantic
Monthly <http://www.wesjones.com/anarchy.htm>.
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IMO, however, does frequently issue "recommendations" that reflect its
knowledge and its concerns about maritime issues. Whether a government
chooses to take up the recommendation is a matter for a government. IMO
has issued a number of recommendations/resolutions concerning mobile
offshore units.
4. The coastal state regulation of offshore drilling moves between
performance-based regulation or prescriptive regulation with elements
of both in many cases. The Pembina Institute review of the offshore
regulatory regimes of the Canadian Arctic, the U.S., the U.K., Greenland
and Norway describes these different ways of regulating:
Prescriptive regulation sets specific technical or procedural requirements
with which regulated entities must comply. Performance-based or
goal-based regulation identifies functions or outcomes for regulated
entities but allows them considerable flexibility to determine how they
will undertake the functions and achieve the outcomes. Each of these
approaches has strengths and limitations. There is evidence of a general
increase in the use of performance-based or goal-based regulation
because of the greater flexibility for innovation and cost effectiveness
when compared with traditional prescriptive requirements. Nonetheless,
prescription may be the more appropriate approach where compulsory
requirements are needed to ensure compliance with standards, provide
gireater certainty regarding requirements, and facilitate monitoring and
enforcement.7 0
Of the jurisdictions reviewed, Dagg et al concluded that it was only the
U.S whose overall regulatory approach was mainly prescriptive.
One of the benefits for the regulator in a goal-based regulation system
is that it shifts the responsibility for defining operational requirement from
the regulator to the operator. In Canada the CanadaOil and Gas Drilling
and Production Regulations7 are very much goal oriented. The NEB
has also issued draft safety plan guidelines to assist operators in meeting
the requirements of the regulations.7 2 As far as the Canadian Arctic is
concerned however, there is one remaining prescriptive rule in place. This
is the same Season Relief Well (SSRW) requirement, which has been in
place in the Canadian Arctic since the 1970s. 73 It requires that an operator

70. Jennifer Dagg et al, "Comparing the Offshore Drilling Regulatory Regimes of the Canadian
Arctic, the U.S, the U.K., Greenland and Norway" (June 2011), online: The Pembina Institute <http://
pubs.pembina.org/reports/comparing-offshore-oil-and-gas-regulations-final.pdf> at 20.
71. CanadaOil and Gas Drillingand ProductionRegulations, SOR/2009-315.
72. National Energy Board Safety Planning Guidelines (31 March 2011), online: National
<http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/elf-nsi/rpblctn/ctsndrgltn/rgltnsndgdlnsprsnttthrct/
Board
Energy
drllngprdctnrgltn/sftplngdln-eng.pdf>.
73. Interestingly, it is not in fact a regulation but is a policy of the NEB.
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be able to demonstrate to the NEB that they can drill a relief well in the
same drilling season.74
Other aspects of international regulation remain prescriptive. The
Coast Guard Report criticized the IMO MODU Code for its adherence to
prescriptive standards and suggested that a "performance-based analysis"
could have served better."
This variety of approach to regulation highlights the absence of an
international consensus. Lee Hunt, the President of IADC, has noted:
[W]e have experienced situations where regulations issued by one
government department simply lead to conflicts with another, in the
process wasting valuable resources without achieving desired benefits. A
lack of 'joined up' government creates vexing situations for contractors,
whereby adherence to one set of legislation or regulation may incur noncompliant legal action with another agency. Typically these situations
arise when Mobile Offshore Drilling Units move from being compliant
with national and international maritime legislation as a vessel, to coastal
state legislation where they are regarded as a temporary oil and gas
facility.. .These conflicts are likely to grow as IMO continues to expand
its body of regulation while national oil and gas industry regulators
continue a parochial approach without effective co-ordination.76
SINTEF,77 in its review of DeepwaterHorizon identified a similar issue:
The oil industry is global, and various actors and facilities move between
countries, adapting to national regulations if required. However, the
design standards very often have a common basis, e.g. represented by
the American API standards. There are however a number of differences,
related to, for example, type of regulatory regime (balance between
prescriptive requirements and functional requirements) and regulations.
There are also differences between standards since the Norwegian
petroleum industry has developed their own NORSOK Standards.
Furthermore, there are differences with respect to operational practice
and safety culture.7"

74. There is extensive material available on the SSRW at <www.neb-one.gc.ca>; see also Spicer,
"Admiralty Issues", supranote 3 at 277-278. In July 2014 the NEB announced that it had agreed to
review alternatives to this requirement in the context of two projects: <http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clfnsi/rthnb/nws/nwsrls/2014/nwsrls24-eng.html>.
75. Coast Guard Report, supra note 4 at 42.
76. Lee Hunt, "The Major Health, Safety, Environment and Regulatory Issues and Concerns"
(4 April 2005), online: OGP <http://info.ogp.org.uk/safety/downloads/IRF.pdf> at 2-3.
77. SINTEF is the largest independent research organization in Scandinavia. Its material is accessible
online: <www.sintef.no>.
78. RK Tinmannsvik et al, "The Deepwater Horizon accident: Causes, lessons learned and
recommendations for the Norwegian petroleum activity: Executive summary" (May 2011),
online: SINTEF <http://www.sintef.no/upload/Konsern/Media/Deepwater/20Horizon%20-%20
SINTEF%20-%20Executive%20summary.pdf> at 9.
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5. The intent of the STCW is to globalize the standards for competency
and experience for seafarers. The Coast Guard Report points out that
seafarers assigned to MODUs are not required to receive any specialized
79
training for crowd control, crisis management or human behaviour.
Those requirements are contained in the 1995 amendments to the STCW,
which followed the capsizing and sinking of the passenger ferry Estonia in
1994.80 The Coast Guard Report recommends similar training be provided
to MODU crews. 8' The Report also notes that "a master must achieve the
competencies required by STCW II/2. ''82 The report also states that "there

are no such.. .professional competency standards [required by STCW] for
the drilling crew [on a MODU] (OIM, tool pusher, driller)."83 It is also
noteworthy that the STCW generally applies to the maritime personnel
of self-propelled MODUs proceeding on voyages but does not apply to
non-self-propelled MODUs or to MODUs on station. However, when a
MODU is on station, the STCWrecommends that the flag state should take
account of relevant IMO recommendations.84
This regulatory maze and the different methods of achieving regulation
have not led to a seamless web.
VII. The Arctic
The Presidents Report discussed the future of drilling in offshore Alaska:
Bringing the potentially large oil resources of the Arctic outer continental
shelf into production safely will require an especially delicate balancing
of economic, human, environmental, and technological factors. Both
industry and government will have to demonstrate standards and a
level of performance higher than they have ever achieved before. One
lesson from the Deepwater Horizon crisis is the compelling economic,
environmental and indeed human rationale for understanding and
addressing the prospective risks comprehensively, before proceeding to
drill in such challenging waters. 85

79. Coast Guard Report, supra note 4 at 124.
80. STCW, supranote 8 at Chapter V.
81. Coast Guard Report, supra note 4 at 124.
82. Ibid at 65; STCW, supranote 8.
83. Coast Guard Report, supra note 4 at 65.
84. STCW, supra note 8.
85. President's Report, supra note 4 at 305. See also World Wildlife Fund, "Lessons Not Learned,
20 Years After the Exxon Valdez Disaster," online: World Wildlife Fund <http://awsassets.wwf.ca/
downloads/wwf_20yearsafter-exxon.pdf>; World Wildlife Fund, "Not So Fast: Some Progress in
Spill Response, But US Still Ill-Prepared for Arctic Offshore Development," online: World Wildlife
Fund <http://awsassets.panda.org/downloads/wwf mms reportanalysisnewp3.pdf>.
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In one of its only references to international regulation, the President's
Report, in discussing the Arctic, points to the work of the Arctic Council
and the necessity for international standards for Arctic oil and gas:
[T]he Commission recommends that strong international standards
related to Arctic oil and gas activities be established among all the
countries of the Arctic. Such standards would require cooperation and
coordination of policies and resources. The Arctic Council has begun
work in this direction, updating its voluntary Arctic Offshore Oil and
Gas Operation Guidelines in 2009.6

A more wide ranging comment might have stated that international
standards related to oil and gas activities should be established among
all countries. The need for international standards cannot be said to be
restricted to the Arctic.
As a result of Deepwater Horizon, the Canadian National Energy
Board conducted an extensive review of its Arctic drilling policy and
published its Report in late 2011. As with the President's Report in the
US, however, the NEB Report did not address the issue of international
regulation of continental shelf activities in any substantive way.87
Issues surrounding the future of drilling in the Arctic have been
prominent since Deepwater Horizon. The Arctic is a "deep water"
location.88 Exploration wells in all likelihood will take multiple drilling
seasons to complete. Hamilton identifies the technology needs that go
along with this exploration:
The technology hurdles for deep water exploration drilling in the more
severe ice environments involve keeping a floating drilling vessel on
station and productively drilling as much of the time as possible, with
occasional disconnects from the well to avoid unmanageable ice, all the
while doing so with extremely high reliability to protect the sensitive
Arctic environment from spills or loss of well control. The need for
86. President's Report, supra note 4 at 304. See also National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill on Offshore Drilling, "Offshore Drilling in the Arctic; Background and Issues for the
Future Consideration'of Oil and Gas Activities," online: <http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/Offshore%2ODrilling%20in%20the%2OArctic-Background%20and%2
Issues%20for/o2Othe%2OFuture%2OConsideration%20ot/200il %20and%2OGas%20Activities0.
pdf>. Transocean filed an extensive response.to the Coastguard Report, available online: <http://www.
deepwater.com/fw/main/lMacondo-Well-lncidient- I175.html>.
87. The Past is Always Present: Review of Offshore Drilling in the Canadian Arctic-Preparing

for the Future (December 2011), online: <http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/clf-nsi/rthnb/pplctnsbfrthnb/
rctcffshrdrllngrvw/finrprt20ll/ffilrprt2Oll-eng.html>. The voluminous material filed in connection
with this review is also available online at: <https://docs.neb-one.gc.ca/ll-eng/llisapi.dll?func=ll&obj
Id=621169&objAction=browse&sort-name> [Canadian National Energy Board Review].
88. Jed M Hamilton, "The Challenges of Deep Water Arctic Development" (2011) 21:4 IJOPE 241

at 241.
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disconnection requires either Dynamic Positioning of a drill ship in ice,
which does not now exist, or a disconnectable, turret moored system that
allows the drilling vessel to move off location with riser connected and
relatively quick re-connection. 9
These difficulties focus attention on various issues already discussed in
this paper including flag state, classification societies and methods of
regulation.
VIII. Need for a convention?
There have been ongoing discussions since the 1970s as to whether or
not an international convention for offshore mobile craft is necessary.
The CMI prepared a Draft Convention on Offshore Mobile Craft at its
meetings in 1977. This draft was known as the "Rio Draft."9
The issue of an International Convention was considered again at the
CMI conference in Australia in 1994. The "Sydney Draft" was the result.91
In its submission to this Conference in 1994, the Canadian Maritime
Law Association (CMLA) articulated the relevance of an International
Convention as being due to:
A renewed interest in offshore energy development, a growing body
of jurisprudence related to a number of accidents involving offshore
oil rigs and related offshore structures, commercial legal problems

relating to offshore drilling units, a greater sensitivity to environmental
and development issues and, last but not least, the increasing technical
sophistication, great92 variety and considerable cost of offshore drilling

units and structures.

The "Sydney Draft" was considered to be inadequate by the CMLA. In its
submission to the Sydney Conference, it identified what it believed to be
the most critical reasons for an international regime in the offshore:

89.
90.
91.
180.
92.

Ibid at 245.
Accessible at <www.comitemaritime.org>.
Comit6 Maritime International, Yearbook (Antwerp: Comite Maritime International, 1994) at
Ibid at 186.
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An International Convention would discourage diverse, unilateral
national initiatives, especially those developed in reaction to an accident
and in the politically charged atmosphere of its aftermath. Furthermore,
a uniform, comprehensive international regime, by creating a suitable
framework for secured financing and making risk management more
predictable, could well assist better returns from existing assets and
facilitate greater private and public investment in offshore petroleum and
mineral resource development.93
The CMLA also noted that an international convention would be of
assistance to all countries:
The fact that a number of coastal states have developed a good regulatory
system for exploration and exploitation in the offshore, would mean that
the best of these systems could be used as a guideline for an international
system, which would be uniform, predictable and thus provide a
minimum baseline. This does not mean that another regulatory system is
superimposed on a good national system. International Conventions only
become 'regulatory' when accepted by signatory states and incorporated
it into their regulatory system. Accordingly, states with good existing
systems have no difficulties in accepting international systems. On the
other hand, smaller states, especially in the developing world, would
have access to the uniform, known system.9 4
No progress was made towards an international convention subsequent to
the "Sydney Draft." The CMLA however continued to press the issue and
in 2004 produced a draft Offshore Convention that contained a specific
Article addressing issues of safety.95 Although there was some academic
activity urging the adoption of an international convention, nothing further
96
had occurred up until the time of the DeepwaterHorizon.
Following Deepwater Horizon, interest was once again revived.
Judge Steven Rares of the Federal Court of Australia delivered a paper
at the 2011 Biennial mini conference of the Maritime Law Association of
Australia and New Zealand calling for an international treaty to deal with

93. Ibidat 191.
94. Ibid at 189.
95. Comit6 Maritime International Newsletter (January/April 2004), online: Comite Maritime
International <http://www.comitemaritime.org/Uploads/Newsletters/2004/Binderl.pdt> at 1.Article
VIII addresses safety issues and requires the designation of "a single person to be in command" and
further prohibits disciplinary action against such a person exercising their authority in good faith. This
Article also requires adherence to the ISM Code.
96. See for instance Michael White, "Offshore Craft and Structures: A Proposed International
Convention" (1999) Aust Mining & Petroleum U 21.
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offshore spills.97 Although this paper is focussed on liability for offshore
spills, it once again brought attention to the argument that an international
convention concerning offshore units was necessary.
The Congressional Research Service Deepwater Horizon issues
document identified the possible role of an international convention:
Congress might consider whether a comprehensive international regime
is warranted, considering plans for oil exploration in especially lifethreatening and environmentally sensitive areas like the Arctic. While
drafts of conventions have been issued and other nations support a
comprehensive IMO regime for oil rigs, the United States is opposed. It
can be argued that the IMO, whose primary concern has been cargo on
cruise ships, does not have the expertise to prescribe technical standards
for offshore oil rigs. Detailed standards do exist on a regional basis
(examples include the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Persian
Gulf), and one could argue that different environments dictate different
requirements. However, the global nature of the oil industry raises the
question of whether an international convention on offshore rigs of all
types would enhance their safety.9
Conclusion
The Deepwater Horizon Reports identified failures and gaps at all levels
of offshore regulation. There are many more interests involved in the
drilling and production of an offshore well than there are in. the safe
conduct of an oil tanker. Unlike the voyage of a ship over deep water, there
are many costs, risks and difficulties of drilling and producing in deep
water. In addition, the numerous contractors with interests in the drilling/
production inevitably add degrees of complexity to attempts at regulation.
The industry is global but is treated differently depending on location and
flag state. The industry should be recognized as a stand-alone entity rather
than as an add-on to the international regulation of the marine industry.
The patchwork of current regulation is not working. The industry requires
an umbrella convention covering, under its wing, the many competing
97. Steven Rares, "An International Convention on Offshore Hydrocarbon Leaks", [2011] LMCLQ
361; See also Mikhail Kashubsky, "Marine Pollution from the Offshore Oil and Gas Industry: Review
of Major Conventions and Russian Law (Part I)" (Nov/Dec 2006) 151 Maritime Studies 1; Jacqueline
Allen, "A Global Oil Stain-Cleaning up International Conventions for Liability and Compensation
for Oil Exploration/Production" (2011) 25 A&NZ Mar LJ 90. At its meeting of 16-20 April 2012,
IMO's Legal Committee considered the issue of liability and compensation for trans-boundary
pollution damage from offshore activities, and concluded that "bilateral and regional arrangements
are the most appropriate way to address the matter and agreed that there was no compelling need to
develop an international regime on the subject." International Maritime Organization, Report of the
Legal Committee on the Work of its 99th Session LG 99/14, 24 April 2012 at para..13.17, online:
<https://docs.imo.org/Shared/Download.aspx?did=72604>.
98. Hagerty & Ramseur, supra note 31 at 38-39 [footnotes omitted].
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issues at play. The industry could learn from the example of the marine
industry and its network of conventions applicable worldwide.
DNV reviewed a number of major hazard incidents for the Canadian
National Energy Board. Those reviewed were the Ocean Ranger,
Chernobyl, Piper Alpha, Westray, Longford, Space Shuttle Columbia and
Texas City. The conclusions are noteworthy:
The assessment of these accidents indicated that, although formal safety
programs or management systems had been developed, they were not
effectively implemented or reviewed on a regular basis to monitor [the]
adequacy and effectiveness [of the programs]. Also, for most of the
incidents an adequate hazard identification and risk assessment process
had not been followed. The relevance of these issues become important
because the basic responsibility for the safe operation of any activity
lies with management of the organization which must ensure that all
the applicable programs and systems are implemented, reviewed and
updated on a regular basis to reflect any required improvements.
In addition, in most cases, the applicable regulatory oversight was not
comprehensive or focused enough to ensure gaps were identified and
the required corrective and preventive actions were developed and
implemented. 99

The offshore industry is at an important juncture. Possible sources of
hydrocarbons are being identified in deeper waters and on the offshore of
countries which have not had a history of offshore activity. 00 Accidents
offshore can easily cause consequences to the environments of countries
other than the immediate coastal state. The complexities of drilling and
producing in deep water or hazardous environments are many and increase
the costs, risks and difficulties inherent in the industry.'0' The commentary
emanating from Ghana and Nigeria, both of which have extensive offshore
holdings, indicates that there is much work to be done to attain a seamless

99. Det Norske Veritas, "Major Hazard Incidents Arctic Offshore Drilling Review Report" (February
2011), online: DNV Managing Risk <http://www.dnvusa.com/Binaries/NEB%20Report%20
April%208_tcm 153-455725.pdf> at i.
100. Deepwater Market Report, supra note 18.
101. The International Association of Oil & Gas Producers commissioned a report on deep water
wells following Deepwater Horizon. This Report is accessible online: <www.ogp.org.uk/pubsl463.
pdf>.
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overall framework for the development of the offshore industry in those
02
countries.1
Thus far, the IMO and the CMI have not been successful in bringing
forward internationally accepted standards for the offshore oil and gas
business. The International Regulators Forum (IRF) is a group of nine
regulators of health and safety in the offshore oil and gas industry. It is
composed of offshore regulators from Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark,
Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom and
the United States. Among the objectives of the IRF is:
[T]o promote best sustainable safety performance globally and the
concept that it is inseparable from and interdependent with best
sustainable economic performance.0 3
It might well be time for the IRF to take up the promulgation of
internationally-accepted standards for the offshore which could obtain
convention-like status through being adopted by the worldwide network
of offshore regulators. Certainly the IRF could learn from the example of
the marine industry and its network of international conventions.
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